Abstract-Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks has two-fold implications. First, each wireless node does not excessively and greedily inject traffic to the shared wireless channel. Second, intermediate nodes voluntarily relay traffic for upstream nodes towards the destination at the cost of its own private resource. Such an assumption supports almost all existing research when it comes to protocol design in ad hoc networks. We believe that without appropriate incentive mechanisms, the nodes are inherently selfish (unwilling to contribute its private resource to relay traffic) and greedy (unfairly sharing the wireless channel). In this paper, we present a price pair mechanism to arbitrate resource allocation and to provide incentives simultaneously such that cooperation is promoted and the desired global optimal network operating point is reached by convergence with a fully decentralized self-optimizing algorithm. Such desired network-wide global optimum is characterized with the concept of Nash bargaining solution, which not only provides the Pareto optimal point for the network, but is also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. We simulate the price pair mechanism and report encouraging results to support and validate our theoretical claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nodes in wireless ad hoc networks not only share the wireless channel in the same local neighborhood, but also relay traffic so that destinations multiple hops away may be reached. In almost all previous work related to wireless ad hoc networks, the following two fundamental assumptions are made. First, nodes do not excessively inject traffic to the locally shared wireless channel. Second, intermediate nodes voluntarily relay traffic for upstream nodes towards the destination. In this paper, we believe that such assumptions may not hold in realistic scenarios, at least not without appropriate incentive-based mechanisms. In fact, they behave in quite the contrary fashion: they are both greedy when it comes to sharing public resource (wireless channel), and selfish when it comes to contributing private resource (such as battery energy). In other words, the network Yuan Xue, Klara Nahrstedt are affiliated with the Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Their email addresses are {xue,klara}@cs.uiuc.edu. Baochun Li is affiliated with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto. His email address is bli@eecg.toronto.edu. may fail to function at all in realistic scenarios once neither assumption holds.
The only way to solve these problems is to design appropriate incentive mechanisms to not only encourage cooperative behavior of selfish nodes, but also curb unfair and excessive resource usage when sharing a common resource pool, such as a shared channel. Such designs of incentives should optimize towards a clearly specified objective, which is a desired optimal operating point of the wireless network. At such an optimal point, resources are shared fairly, and the levels of cooperation are adequate for all necessary data communications and network functions. This paper exactly targets this critical issue in multi-hop wireless networks.
Our original contributions are two-fold. First, we clearly characterize the desired network-wide optimal operating point using a game theoretic framework, based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). NBS naturally encapsulates two favorable properties: (1) Pareto efficiency in terms of resource usage; and (2) a set of fairness axioms with respect to resource allocations. Using this framework, the problem of finding the desired globally optimal operating point may be formulated as a non-linear optimization problem. Second, we propose a decentralized algorithm that uses a price pair mechanism to arbitrate incentives. With a pair of prices, localized self-optimization by individual nodes naturally converges to globally optimal network operating points. Within the price pair, the channel price regulates greedy usage of the shared wireless channel, while the relay price encourages traffic relaying. Effectively, our price pair mechanism transforms non-cooperative behavior in wireless ad hoc networks to a cooperative game, whose optimal operating points demonstrate more advantageous properties than the usual Nash Equilibrium in typical non-cooperative environments.
The essence of our paper is to integrate the mechanisms that use pricing as signals to (1) fairly allocate resources; and (2) adequately incentivize cooperative behavior. Though there exists previous work towards either one of these objectives, we are not aware of existing work that integrates both prices into a coherent framework. Such integration becomes more complicated if we consider the unique channel contention characteristics in wireless ad hoc networks, where the traffic flows contend in multiple contention cliques. Considerations of such unique complications in ad hoc networks are beyond all of the existing work in the area of pricing or incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II presents some preliminaries before formal treatment of this topic. Sec. III defines the desired network operating points using the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. We present the distributed algorithm in Sec. IV. We show simulation results in Sec. V, present related work in Sec. VI and finally conclude the paper in Sec. VII.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a wireless ad hoc network which consists of a set of nodes N = {1, 2, ..., N }. In this network, only nodes that are within the transmission range of each other can communicate directly and form a wireless link. We model such a network as a bidirectional graph G N = (N , L), where L = {1, 2, ..., L} is the set of wireless links.
In such a network, a wireless node i ∈ N may establish an end-to-end flow, or simply flow, f i with rate x i to another node. Flow f i is assumed to be elastic: it requires a minimum rate of x m i and a maximum rate of
In general, f i flows through multiple hops in the network, passing a set of wireless links. We use this set of wireless links to represent f i , i.e., f i ⊂ L. We denote the set of relaying nodes for flow f i as R(f i ), and the destination of f i as D(f i ). For simplicity of exposition, we further define H(f i ) = R(f i ) ∪ {D(f i ), i} as the set of nodes f i traverses, and K(f i ) = H(f i ) − {i}. A single-hop data transmission along a particular wireless link is referred to as a subflow, and is a part of a flow. Several subflows from different flows along the same wireless link form an aggregated subflow.
In such a network, nodes compete for two types of resources: shared wireless channel and individual nodes' relaying cost (such as energy). The availability of these resources constrains the solution space of resource allocations. We proceed to analyze the characteristics of both types of resources.
A. Shared wireless channel: location-dependent contention
The shared-medium multi-hop nature of wireless ad hoc networks presents unique characteristics of locationdependent contention and spatial reuse of spectrum.
Compared with wireline networks where flows contend only at the router with other simultaneous flows through the same router (contention in the time domain), the unique characteristics of multi-hop wireless networks show that, flows also compete for shared channel bandwidth if they are within the transmission ranges of each other (contention in the spatial domain).
In particular, two subflows contend with each other if either the source or destination of one subflow is within the transmission range of the source or destination of the other 1 . The locality of wireless transmissions implies that the degree of contention for the shared medium is location-dependent. On the other hand, two subflows that are geographically far away have the potential to transmit simultaneously, reusing the wireless channel.
We now formulate the resource constraints that reflect the unique characteristics of wireless ad hoc networks. First, let us consider a set of mutually contending subflows. In this set, only one subflow can transmit at a time. Intuitively, the aggregated rate of all subflows in this set can not exceed the channel capacity. Formally, we consider a subflow contention graph. In this graph, each vertex corresponds to an aggregated subflow in the original network. Each edge in the graph denotes that two aggregated subflows which correspond to the two vertices, contend with each other. Formally, let
In a graph, a complete subgraph is referred to as a clique. A maximal clique is defined as a clique that is not contained in any other cliques 2 . In a subflow contention graph, the vertices in a maximal clique represent a maximal set of mutually contending subflows. Intuitively, each maximal clique in a subflow contention graph represents a "maximal distinct contention region", since at most one subflow in the clique can transmit at any time and adding any other subflows into this clique will introduce the possibility of simultaneous transmissions. For simplicity, we use the set of vertices in a clique to represent the clique, and denote it as q. Furthermore, we denote the set of all maximal cliques in a subflow contention graph as Q.
Here we illustrate the above concepts using an example. The network topology and the Fig. 1(a) . The corresponding subflow contention graph is shown in Fig. 1(b) . In this example, there are three maximal cliques in the contention graph:
and
We proceed to consider the problem of allocating rates to wireless links. We claim that a rate allocation y = (y l , l ∈ L) is feasible, if there exists a collisionfree transmission schedule that allocates y l to l. We now formalize the condition implied by such a feasible rate allocation.
Lemma 1. If a rate allocation y = (y l , l ∈ L) is feasible, then the following condition is satisfied:
where C is the channel capacity. Eq. (1) gives an upper bound on the rate allocations to the wireless links. In practice, however, such a bound may not be tight, especially with carriersensing-multiple-access-based wireless networks (such as IEEE 802.11). In this case, we introduce C q , the achievable channel capacity at a clique q. More formally, if l∈q y l ≤ C q then y = (y l , l ∈ L) is feasible. To this end, we observe that each maximal clique may be regarded as an independent channel resource unit with capacity C q . It motivates the use of the maximal clique as a basic resource unit for pricing in wireless ad hoc networks, as compared to the notion of a link in wireline networks.
We now proceed to consider resource constraints on rate allocations among flows. To facilitate discussions, we define a clique-flow matrix R = {R qi }, where R qi = |q ∩ f i | represents the number of subflows that flow f has in the clique q. If we treat a maximal clique as an independent resource, then the clique-flow matrix R represents the "resource usage pattern" of each flow. Let the vector C = (C q , q ∈ Q) be the vector of achievable channel capacities in each of the cliques. Constraints with respect to rate allocations to end-to-end flows in wireless ad hoc networks are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In a wireless ad hoc network G N = (N , L), there exists a feasible rate allocation x = (x i , i ∈ N ), if and only if Rx ≤ C.
Proof: It is obvious that Rx ≤ C ⇔ ∀q ∈ Q, i∈N R qi x i ≤ C q . By the definition of R, we have i∈N R qi x i = l∈q y l . The result follows naturally from Lemma 1 and its following discussions.
⊓ ⊔
B. Costs of Relays
Relaying traffic for upstream nodes apparently incurs cost, since localized resources need to be consumed, such as energy, CPU cycle, and memory space. Without loss of generality, we use energy levels on each node as an example to characterize such costs of relays. Given a minimum expected lifetime in the network, each node j has a budget on its energy consumption rate, denoted as E j . Here, we consider two types of energy consumption related to packet transmission: (1) e r as the energy consumed for receiving a unit flow; (2) e s as the energy consumed for transmitting a unit flow. Then the energy consumption at node j is x j e s + i:j∈R(fi) x i (e r +e s )+ i:j=D(fi) x i e r . As the energy consumption rate can not exceed the energy budget, we have the following relation:
We now proceed to define a N × N matrix B as follows.
otherwise (3) B specifies the relaying relation among nodes in the ad hoc network. To summarize, the local constraint on energy can be formalized as follows:
where E = (E j , j ∈ N ) is the energy consumption budget vector.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we characterize the desired networkwide optimal operating point using a game theoretic framework, based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). NBS naturally encapsulates two favorable properties: (1) Pareto efficiency in terms of resource usage; and (2) a set of fairness axioms with respect to resource allocations. Using this framework, the problem of finding the desired globally optimal operating point may be formulated as a non-linear optimization problem. We show how such a global optimization problem may be decomposed into localized greedy optimization problems via a price pair.
A. Nash Bargaining Solution: a game theoretical formulation
We present the basic concepts and results of Nash bargaining solutions (NBS) from game theory [1] and show how it can characterize and formulate the desired network operation point, towards which our price pair mechanism should converge.
The basic setting of the problem is as follows: The set of nodes N in the wireless ad hoc network G N constitutes a set of players in the game. They compete for the use of a fixed amount of resources (wireless channel and costs of relays such as energy). The rate allocation x = (x i , i ∈ N ) is the utility vector of all players in the game. Let S ⊂ R N be the set of all feasible utility vectors. We assume that S is a non-empty convex closed and bounded set. Further, we denote the initial agreement point of the game as x * , which is the guaranteed utilities of players without any cooperation in order to enter the game.
In such a problem setting, a bargaining problem is any (S, x * ) where {x ∈ S|x ≥ x * } = ∅. In other words, a bargaining problem is actually a set of rate allocations x that is acceptable to all players. Let B = {(S, x * )} denote the set of all bargaining problems. It then follows that a bargaining solution is any function ϕ :
A bargaining solution actually specifies finding a rate allocation within all acceptable allocations. A natural question about the bargaining solution is how such a function ϕ is to be defined. There are two reasonable properties desired for a bargaining solution: (1) efficient use of resources; and (2) fair allocation among all players. These two conditions are precisely encapsulated by the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Nash Bargaining Solution). A bargaining solution ϕ : B → R N is a Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), ifx = ϕ(S, x * ) satisfies the Nash Axioms A1-A6. A1 (Individual rationality)x ≥ x * ; A2 (Feasibility)x ∈ S; A3 (Pareto optimality) If ∀x ∈ S, x ≥x, then x =x; A4 (Independence of irrelevant alternatives) Ifx ∈ T ⊂ S andx = ϕ(S, x * ), thenx = ϕ(T, x * ); A5 (Independence of linear transformation) Let T be obtained from S by the linear transformation φ(x) with
Then if ϕ(S, x * ) =x, then ϕ(T, φ(x * )) = φ(x); A6 (Symmetry) Suppose S is symmetric with respect to a subset J ⊆ {1, 2, ..., N } of indices, then ϕ is symmetry, which means that if x ∈ S and for i, j ∈ J, x * i = x * j , thenx i =x j . The above axioms encapsulate both the concept of Pareto optimality (A3) and the concept of fairness (A4-A6). Pareto optimality means that there is no other point which gives strict superior utility for all the players simultaneously. The definition of Pareto optimality reflects the condition of efficient use of resources, where there are no "idle" resources in the network. The existing work in game theory [1] and its application in wireline communication networks [2] establish the following results for NBS. Proposition 2. There exists a unique function ϕ defined on all bargaining problems (S, x * ) that satisfies axioms A1-A6, i.e., a unique Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) exists. Moreover, the unique solutionx is a unique vector that solves the following maximization problems:
Equivalently,
B. Network operating points: optimal and fair rate allocations
We assume that each player involved in the game can be guaranteed with its minimum rate vector x m . Thus, the minimum rate vector x m can be regarded as an initial agreement point of the game x * . From the discussions in Sec. III-A, it is clear that the NBS formulates the desired network operation point, which is fair to all nodes while efficient from the network's point of view. Thus, the problem of finding the globally optimal resource allocation is transformed to solving the NBS of its corresponding game, which is the solution of the following nonlinear optimization problem by Proposition 2.
The objective function in Eq. (7) of the optimization problem corresponds to the optimization problem whose solution is NBS. The constraints of the optimization problem Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) are the constraints from the shared wireless channel and costs of relays, respectively, as discussed in Sec. II.
Note that the objective function i∈N ln(x i − x m i ) is strictly concave. In addition, the feasible region of the optimization problem is non-empty, convex, and compact. By non-linear optimization theory, there exists a maximizing value of argument x for the above optimization problem. Let us consider the Lagrangian form of the optimization problem P:
where µ α = (µ α q , q ∈ Q), µ β = (µ β j , j ∈ N ) are two vectors of Lagrange multipliers. The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality of problem P. Thus, for i ∈ N , the following conditions hold:
In the Lagrangian form shown in Eq. (11), the Lagrange multipliers µ α q can be regarded as the implied cost of unit flow accessing the channel at the maximal clique q. In other words, µ α q is the shadow price of clique q, called channel price. This price corresponds to the shared channel resource constraint. The Lagrange multipliers µ β j can be regarded as the implied relay cost of unit flow at node j. In other words, µ β j is the shadow price of relay at node j, called relay price. This pair of prices (µ α , µ β ) will be used as incentives so that localized self-optimizing decision can implement the global optimum. In particular, the price µ α will signal a "charge" (contrary to incentives) to the shared channel usage and regulate the greedy behavior, while the price µ β will provide incentives to traffic relays at intermediate nodes and regulate the selfish behavior of wireless nodes.
Let us denote
Clearly,
Then λ α i and λ β i are the prices for node i, which is the source of flow f i , for accessing shared channels and relay services, respectively. For channel usage, node i needs to pay for all the maximal cliques that it traverses. For each clique, the price to pay is the product of the number of wireless links that f i traverses in this clique and the shadow price of this clique as in Eq. (18). Alternatively, the price of flow f i is the aggregated price of all its subflows. For each subflow, its price is the aggregated price of the maximal cliques that it belongs to as in Eq. (19). Note that such a pricing policy for end-to-end flows is fundamentally different from the pricing models in wireline networks, where a flow's price is the aggregation of the link prices which it traverses. Such difference is rooted at the nature of the shared medium -the interference and spatial reuse of wireless channel in an ad hoc network. For traffic relay services, node i needs to pay for the relay costs of all relaying nodes of f i , including itself and the destination. Using flow f 1 as an example, the channel price model is illustrated in Fig. 2(a) and the relay price model is illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . The channel price for f 1 is λ To summarize, we have the following results with respect to the globally optimal network operating point. Theorem 1. There exists a unique solution to problem P (i.e., unique NBS), which is characterized as follows: There exist two vectors
where
C. Local strategies: self-optimizing decisions
With the understanding of the global optimal point, we now study how this point can be achieved in a distributed manner by localized self-optimizing decisions at each individual node. The key to this goal is to use the pair of prices (µ α , µ β ) as signals to coordinate the distributed decisions.
First, we study the conditions that the prices need to satisfy in order to incentivize local node decisions so that they could implement the global network optimum. Let us consider the following problems:
Channel(A, C; µ α ):
where λ α i is a function of µ α , as defined in Eq. (16). Problem Channel(A, C; µ α ) maximizes the total revenue of channel based on charging λ α i per unit of bandwidth to user i subject to the channel capacity constraint.
Relay(B, E; µ β ):
where λ β i is a function of µ β , as defined in Eq. (17) . Problem Relay(B, E; µ β ) maximizes the total relay revenue of all nodes subject to the relay cost constraint at each individual node. Now let us consider a local self-optimizing decision at each node i which corresponds to the following problem:
The relationship between localized node decision and the global optimal network operating point is then given as follows. Then x also solves problem P.
The proof of this theorem is given in our technical report [3] .
Let us denote
Now we show that Φ(x i ) reflects the "net benefit" of node i and problem Node i (λ α i , λ β i , µ β i ) maximizes the node i's net benefit. This claim is based on the following two observations. First, node i does not pay its relay cost to itself from a local point of view, while the flow relay price λ β i , which is defined from a global point of view, contains the price of relay for itself. Thus from a local point of view, the cost of node i is:
And the revenue of node i is:
Second, from Theorem 2 we have
Thus it is clear that Φ(x i ) reflects the "net benefit" of node i, which is the difference between utility, revenue and cost.
IV. ALGORITHM
Although the global problem P can be mathematically solvable in a centralized fashion, it is impractical for realistic operations in wireless ad hoc networks. In this section, we present a distributed iterative algorithm for price calculation and resource arbitration. We show that the iterative algorithm converges to the global optimum, and maximizes the local net benefit at each node simultaneously.
A. Dual Problem
In order to achieve a distributed solution, we first look at the dual problem of P as follows.
Note that Φ(x i ) is node i's "net benefit". By the separation nature of Lagrangian form, maximizing L(x, µ α , µ β ) can be decomposed into separately maximizing Φ(x i ) for each node i ∈ N (Sec. 3.4.2 in [4] ). We now have
As Φ(·) is strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable, a unique maximizer of Φ(x i ) exists when
We define the maximizer as follows:
Note that
) is usually called demand function, which reflects the optimal rate for node i with channel price as λ α i and relay price as λ β i .
B. Distributed Algorithm
We solve the dual problem D using the gradient projection method [4] . In this method, µ α and µ β are adjusted in the opposite direction to the gradient ∇D(µ α , µ β ):
where γ is the stepsize. D(µ α , µ β ) is continuously differentiable since ln(·) is strictly concave [4] . Thus, it follows that
Substituting Eq. (43) into (41) and (44) into (42), we have
Eq. (45) and Eq. (46) reflect the law of supply and demand. If the demand for bandwidth at clique q exceeds its supply C q , the channel constraint is violated. Thus, the channel price µ α q is raised. Otherwise, µ α q is reduced. Similarly, in Eq. (46), if the demand for energy at node j exceeds its budget E j , the energy constraint is violated. Thus, the relay price µ β j is raised. Otherwise, µ β j is reduced.
We summarize our algorithm in Table I , where clique q and node i are deemed as entities capable of computing and communicating.
We now show the property of this distributed iterative algorithm. Let us define 
2 andκ = max i∈N κ i . Theorem 3 (Global convergence and optimality). Suppose 0 < γ < 2/κȲZ. Starting from any initial rates x m ≤ x(0) ≤ x M , and prices µ α (0) ≥ 0 and µ β (0) ≥ 0, every accumulation point (x * , µ α * , µ β * ) of the sequence (x(t), µ α (t), µ β (t)) generated by the algorithm in Table I is primal-dual optimal.
The reader is referred to our technical report [3] for a detailed proof. Though there exists a unique maximizer x * to the problem P, there may be multiple dual optimal prices, since only the flow price is constrained at optimality according to
. Theorem 3 does not guarantee convergence to a unique vector (x * , µ α * , µ β * ), though any convergent subsequence leads to the optimal rate allocation x * .
In the above iterative algorithm, a maximal clique is regarded as a network element that can carry out the functions of price calculation and notification. However, a maximal clique is only a concept defined based on subflow contention graph. To deploy the algorithm in an actual ad hoc network, the above tasks of a maximal clique need to be carried out by the nodes that constitute the clique in a distributed fashion. For the implementation details, readers are referred to our report [3] .
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We present the simulation results of our price pair mechanism and the distributed algorithm on a simple network as shown in Fig. 1 . The reader is referred to our technical report [3] for extensive results and performance evaluation.
In the first experiment, the network parameters are as follows: channel capacity C q = 2Mbps, for q = 1, 2, 3; relay cost E j = 2 for j = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and E 4 = 3. The minimum and maximum rate requirement of flows are x m i = 0Mbps and x M i = 2Mbps, for all i = 1, ..., 7.
Step size γ = 0.05. It is obvious that the minimum rate requirement can be guaranteed. We show the convergence behavior of our iterative algorithm in this experiment. As shown in Fig. 3 , the algorithm converges to a global network equilibrium within about 800 iterations. At the equilibrium point, the optimal resource allocation and prices are listed in Tab. II.
In the second set of experiments, we show how both channel price and relay price are necessary to regulate and incentivize the network to operate at its optimal point. In particular, we simulate on the same network as in the first experiment with only one price. The results in comparison with the result based on price pair are shown in Tab. II. It is easy to see that the network does not operate at its desired point (i.e., NBS), when only one price (either channel price or relay price) is used. Above results show that in a typical network environment, using either only channel price to regulate the usage of shared wireless channel or only relay price to incentivize traffic relay for other nodes can not reach the adequate level of cooperation, where global network operates at its optimal point.
VI. RELATED WORK
The problem of optimal and fair resource allocation has been extensively studied in the context of wireline networks. Among these works, pricing has been shown to be an effective approach to achieve distributed solution for flow control [5] [6] [7] and service differentiation [8] . Simultaneously, game theory is applied to model resource sharing among multiple users, e.g., [2] [9] .
The main difference that distinguishes our work from the existing works is rooted in the unique characteristics of resource models of ad hoc network. First, the allocation mechanism needs to consider two types of resources, namely, the shared channel and the private resource such as energy. Second, due to the location dependent contention and spatial reuse of the shared channel resource, the channel price is associated with a maximal clique in the subflow contention graph, rather than a wireline link. This presents a different pricing policy for end-to-end flows.
Incentives in wireless networks have stimulated much research interests. (e.g., in the context of ad hoc networks [10] [11] [12] and in wireless LAN [13] ). In particular, the work in [10] presents virtual credit based mechanisms to stimulate cooperation in ad hoc networks, where virtual credits (so called nuglets) are awarded for packet forwarding. Some approaches [14] [15] use a reputation based mechanism where selfish or misbehaving nodes are identified, isolated or punished. Our work distinguishes from the existing works in that, it does not only promote cooperation in packet forwarding, more importantly, it studies at what level of cooperation the network operates at its optimal point, and how to achieve such cooperation using pricing as incentives.
Noncooperative game theory has been used to model the relaying behavior among nodes in ad hoc networks in [11] [12] . By designing appropriate game strategies and analyzing the Nash Equilibrium of the corresponding relaying game, these works show the existence of a network operating point where node cooperation is promoted. In our work, Nash bargaining solution is used to characterize the global network operating point, which usually demonstrates more advantageous properties, such as Pareto optimality and fairness, than the usual Nash Equilibrium in a noncooperative game.
There are also previous works that address the issue of resource allocation [16] and use a price-based approach [17] . However, the ad hoc network models in these works do not consider the shared nature of the wireless channel, and thus their solutions are not able to capture the unique issues in wireless ad hoc networks. Moreover, the price-based distributed algorithm presented in [16] only converges to a network optimum when its utility function takes certain a special form, and such a utility function does not satisfy the fairness axiom.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presents a price pair mechanism that both regulates greedy behaviors and incentivizes selfish users in ad hoc networks. A pair of prices is the centerpiece of this mechanism: (1) the channel price that reflects the unique characteristics of location dependent contention in ad hoc networks, and regulates the usage of shared wireless channel; (2) the relay price that gives incentives to reach the adequate level of cooperation with respect to traffic relay. By using such a price pair as a signal, the decentralized self-optimizing decisions at each individual node converges to the global network optimal operation point.
